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Abstract
The paper analyses the divergence and convergence of the characteristics of 
China’s economic relationships with Africa – trade, investment and aid – with 
Africa’s ‘traditional’ partners, i.e. Western industrialised countries. It argues that 
these relationships may foster structural transformation of African economies. 
The latter have indeed exhibited spectacular growth rates since the early-2000s, 
which have partly been driven by China, via China’s demand for goods pro-
duced in sub-Saharan Africa and its contribution to high commodity prices. In 
addition, China’s relationships with sub-Saharan Africa are driven by invest-
ment, not only in African countries’ infrastructure, but also in industrial sectors, 
both being key determinants of structural transformation. The paper reveals the 
convergence of the trade relationships between China and sub-Saharan Afri-
ca with those of industrialised countries and sub-Saharan Africa, in particular 
similar ambivalent effects (the detrimental effects of commodity-based trade 
patterns and the positive effects of investment). However, in addition to differ-
ences regarding conditional aid, China’s specific modalities regarding trade and 
investment may make an original contribution to sub-Saharan Africa’s structur-
al transformation.
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1. Introduction1
China has been a major trading and investment partner of sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) economies since the early-2000s, with the economic impact of China’s 
relationship with SSA having become the subject of an increasing literature. The 
paper analyses the divergence and convergence of the characteristics of China’s 
economic relationships with Africa – trade, investment and aid – with those of 
Africa’s ‘traditional’ partners, i.e. Western industrialised countries. The paper 
argues that these relationships may foster the structural transformation of SSA 
economies, including productivity growth and industrialisation. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has indeed exhibited spectacular growth rates since the 
early-2000s, which have been driven by China via direct and indirect transmis-
sion channels, notably China’s demand for SSA goods and China’s contribution 
to high international commodity prices, SSA export structures being character-
ised by a high proportion of primary commodities. A long period of high growth 
rates, together with improved fiscal room for manoeuvre, may constitute a gen-
uine opportunity for structural transformation for SSA. Equally, commodities 
may create linkages towards industrialisation. In addition, China’s relationships 
with SSA are also driven by increasing investment, not only in SSA infrastruc-
ture, but also in industrial sectors, both being key determinants of diversification 
and structural transformation.
The paper reveals the convergence of the trade relationships between China 
and SSA with those between industrialised countries and SSA – its ‘traditional’ 
partners -, in particular similar ambivalent effects: i.e., the detrimental effects 
of the commodity-based trade patterns and positive effects of investment. The 
paper, however, shows the specificities of China’s impact on SSA: in addition 
to differences in the matter of development cooperation and conditional aid (ab-
sence of conditionalities), China’s specific modalities regarding trade and in-
vestment (notably in manufacturing) may make an original contribution to SSA 
industrialisation and structural transformation.
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it underscores the convergence of 
China with SSA’s ‘traditional’ partners regarding trade and foreign direct invest-
ment. Secondly, it shows China’s divergence vis-à-vis industrialised countries 
– regarding aid - and its potential contribution to SSA structural transformation.
1  Aspects of this paper have been published in the Proceedings of the 13th African Studies Conference, 
Africa’s Growing Role in World Politics, T. Deych et al. eds., Moscow, Institute for African Studies of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2014. 
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2. China’s trade and investment policies: convergence
with industrialised countries
2.1. The pattern of trade between sub-Saharan Africa and China: China’s 
convergence with industrialised countries
(a) A similar trade pattern: trading commodities
Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by an export structure that is based on com-
modities for its exports to all countries, developed and emerging –more than 
75% of total exports in some SSA countries (World Bank, 2012). Both for fuel 
and non-fuel exporters, it is this distorted structure that has been the main driver 
of growth during the 2000s (5% in 2014, 4.5% in 2015, IMF, 2015), because of 
the increase in commodity prices (fuels and non-fuels) between the early-2000s 
and 2014, moreover with co-movements between all prices (Baffes and Hanio-
tis, 2010) (Figure 1).
Figure 1: suB-saharan aFrica: gdP groWth rate (right scaLe) and commoditY Pric-
es (2010=100, reaL 2005 us doLLars, LeFt scaLe), 1960-2014
Source: World Bank commodity prices data (‘pink sheet’) and World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators, March 2015.
15
Sindzingre: Fostering structural change
Sub-Saharan African countries exported in 2013 a lower share of their products 
to their ‘traditional partners’ (the US and the EU countries) than in the previous 
decade, and a greater share to emerging countries, in particular China (Figure 
2). 
Figure 2: suB-saharan aFrica: totaL exPorts, aLL Products, BiLLions us doLLars, 
annuaL, 1995-2013
Source: UNCTAD Statistics: http://unctadstat.unctad.org, May 2015.
The sustained demand for SSA commodities by China represents a diversifica-
tion of partners. A key point is that regarding its trade pattern with SSA, China 
does not exhibit any ‘exceptionalism’ (in contrast with its claims in the domain 
of international relations, Alden and Large, 2011), and China’s trade pattern 
with SSA converges with the century-old pattern of developed countries (Eu-
ropean countries and the United States). Western countries’ trade commodities 
with SSA since the colonial period and their trade patterns still broadly follow 
the model of the ‘small colonial open economy’ – exporting commodities, im-
porting manufactured products (Hopkins, 1973). China imports primary com-
modities (‘hard’ commodities, e.g. minerals, notably oil or metals, and ‘soft’ 
commodities, such as agricultural raw materials) from SSA and exports indus-
trial products to the continent (Ye, 2010) (Figures 3a and 3b). 
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Figure 3a: suB-saharan aFrica exPorts to china BY keY Product grouPs,  
1995-2014, BiLLions us doLLars
Source: UNCTAD Statistics: http://unctadstat.unctad.org, November 2015.
Figure 3B: suB-saharan aFrica exPorts to g8 countries BY keY Product grouPs, 
1995-2014, BiLLions us doLLars
Source: UNCTAD Statistics: http://unctadstat.unctad.org, November 2015.
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In 2014, primary commodities, precious stones and non-monetary gold thus 
represented 96.4% of SSA exports to China (67.3 billion US dollars out of a to-
tal of 69.8 billion), and 83.7% of SSA exports to G8 countries (78.5 billion US 
dollars out of a total of 93.7 billion).2
China continues this pattern of commodity-based export structure, via two 
channels: China’s contribution to high international commodity prices and 
Chinese demand for SSA products. China has indeed become the first import-
ing country in the world, and notably of primary commodities.3 While China’s 
impact on world trade and prices varies by commodity, China’s demand and 
imports have become over the 2000s a central driver of high prices in a signifi-
cant number of commodities (Akyüz, 2012), especially metals (e.g., aluminium, 
copper, iron) and agricultural raw materials (Roache, 2012). China is now the 
first energy consumer in the world (IMF, 2011a). 
China also follows the same trade patterns as developed countries (European 
countries and the United States) regarding its exports to SSA, i.e. it exports 
industrial products. China’s exports to SSA, however, are made up of products 
that are more situated in the low-end than those from developed countries. Chi-
na’s exports to SSA are different from its exports to developed countries, which 
involve more sophisticated products – as is the case for the trade of developed 
countries between themselves. China’s trade is indeed driven by its comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive production and economies of scale in its shipping 
and light manufacturing sectors (Eisenman, 2012).
China’s exports of low-end cheap manufactured products may be a threat to 
SSA manufacturing sectors and may strengthen the specialisation of SSA com-
modity-exporters in this export pattern (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2008) – which 
has been compounded by the appreciation of SSA countries real exchange rates 
relative to the Chinese renminbi (Guillaumont-Jeanneney and Hua, 2015). 
Moreover, even if they have declined relative to China over the 2000s, relative 
unit labour costs remain high in many SSA countries, which affects their com-
petitiveness in labour-intensive manufacturing (Ceglowski et al., 2015). This 
detrimental impact of Chinese exports has been demonstrated and measured 
2 Source: UNCTAD statistics: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx. Primary 
commodities are defined by UNCTAD as the categories 0+1+2+3+4+68 of the United Nations Stan-
dard International Trade Classification (SITC).
3 Jamil Anderlini and Lucy Hornby, China overtakes US as world’s largest goods trader, Financial Times, 
10 January 2014: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7c2dbd70-79a6-11e3-b381-00144feabdc0.html#axz-
z32aXUvTX5
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in the case of South Africa’s exports of manufactures (Jenkins and Edwards, 
2015), as well as employment and output in the manufacturing sector (Edwards 
and Jenkins, 2015) (for the periods 1997-2010 and 1992-2010 respectively) and 
particularly affects South African low-technology labour intensive industries. 
China’s exports may thus have a negative impact on the possibility of structural 
transformation in SSA and therefore long-term growth. Yet China also exports 
machinery to SSA (e.g., excavators, bulldozers, etc). As argued by Poon (2014), 
Chinese technology capacities in medium technology machinery equipment 
sectors can be particularly helpful in filling gaps and bottlenecks that affects 
SSA manufacturing sectors - this sector has been viewed since Arthur Lewis’ 
studies as a key route towards sustained growth. 
(b) The negative economic effects of a commodity-based export structure
High commodity prices represent a positive gain for SSA exporters of these 
commodities, as they imply an enhanced fiscal space, hence more space for 
investment, which is a key determinant of long-term growth. Yet this commod-
ity-based trade pattern has notorious negative effects (Sindzingre, 2012; Robin-
son and Sindzingre, 2012). Among them is the inherent volatility of commodity 
prices, which, in turn, spawns volatility in fiscal receipts and thereby the ratchet 
effects that may stall investment or generate unsustainable debt for investments 
already implemented - in addition to ‘Dutch disease’ (Nissanke and Kuleshov, 
2013). Price shocks affect both exporters and importers: in oil-rich countries 
government revenues from natural resources represented 60% of total govern-
ment revenues in 2011 (World Bank, 2012), while most SSA countries are oil 
importers and also vulnerable to oil price volatility. Price volatility has a neg-
ative impact on GDP growth rates for SSA countries not only because prices 
may decline, but also because volatility per se, i.e. repeated price shocks, is 
detrimental to long-term growth. 
Indeed, after a remarkable increase during the 2000s, commodity prices (oil 
prices in particular), witnessed a sharp decrease at the end of 2014 due to several 
factors, including the US production of shale gas and oil and a deceleration of 
China’s growth, with detrimental effects in terms of growth and fiscal revenues 
on SSA oil producers.4 
This distorted export structure also affects SSA trade and explains the de-
crease of SSA’s share in global exports, despite the increase of SSA exports in 
absolute value (Figure 4). 
4  See http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2014/12/22/seven-questions-about-the-recent-oil-price-slump
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Figure 4: suB-saharan aFrica’s merchandise exPorts: Percentage oF WorLd 
exPorts (right axis) and vaLue (LeFt axis), 1948-2014 (BiLLions us doLLars)
Source: UNCTAD Statistics: http://unctadstat.unctad.org, November 2015.
In other words, other countries trade goods with greater value added, thus gener-
ating more divergence than convergence of SSA with other countries (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: share in WorLd merchandise exPorts BY region, 1948-2014 (Percent)
Source: UNCTAD Statistics: http://unctadstat.unctad.org, November 2015.
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Similarly, when SSA growth performances are put in a longer-term perspective, 
the broad picture is that of a divergence vis-à-vis other regions (Figure 6).
Figure 6: gdP Per caPita, suB-saharan aFrica vs. the WorLd, 1960–2014,  
constant 2005 us doLLars
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, March 2016.
In addition, SSA countries’ trade and investment domestic policies may have 
little effect on their growth rates if the latter depend on price fluctuations that 
are determined by the growth and demand of other countries (the United States, 
European countries, China) and on the vagaries of trade partners’ domestic pol-
icies. A key point is that the contribution of China does not exhibit any speci-
ficity as compared to SSA’s ‘traditional’ partners and the increase in trade with 
China may just be a ‘diversification of dependence’ (Taylor, 2014a). 
Equally, high commodity prices strengthen SSA commodity exporters’ in-
centives to remain commodity producers (Sindzingre, 2013). These incentives 
also create crowding-out effects vis-à-vis the possibility for entrepreneurs to in-
vest in industries and build industrial sectors, which are the best routes towards 
growth. Another key negative impact on growth of the dependence on primary 
commodities for exports is the low value added of commodities (compared with 
manufactured products) and the low productivity of commodity sectors, espe-
cially agriculture. Yet long-term growth is based on structural transformation: 
i.e., the shift from a regime of low-productivity to a regime of high-productivity 
(usually manufactured products): indeed, the difference in the productivity lev-
els between high-income countries and SSA remains very large (Rodrik, 2011). 
Therefore, Chinese investment in SSA manufacturing sectors may have a sig-
nificant positive impact.
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2.2. Investment in sub-Saharan Africa by Chinese firms
(a) The convergence in the determinants of foreign direct investment in SSA by 
industrialised countries and China
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) is difficult to compute and available 
statistics are difficult to handle (Pairault, 2013a), due in particular to the use of 
tax havens and ‘roundtripping’ of FDI (Milelli and Sindzingre, 2013; Pairault, 
2013b). China’s FDI in SSA is equally difficult to analyse as Chinese official 
statistics (e.g., produced by China’s Ministry of Commerce) underestimate ac-
tual FDI flows from China (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009), notably because of this 
‘roundtripping’ and the use of offshore financial centres.5 Chinese official statis-
tics may be inconsistent with SSA countries national statistics on FDI, as in the 
case of South Africa: the official Chinese data on China’s FDI stock in South Af-
rica at end-2007 were 10 times larger than the official South African assessment, 
but for end-2008, the South African figure was 20% larger than the Chinese one 
(Gelb, 2010: 6). They also do not enable any cross-comparison (Pairault, 2013b) 
and are moreover ambiguous, as they may include in FDI services related to 
infrastructure (e.g., provision of equipment and construction), though such ser-
vices are not FDI according to OECD, IMF or UNCTAD definitions (Pairault, 
2013a).6 For their part, UNCTAD data do not disaggregate Chinese FDI in SSA 
by sector.7 Also, as shown by Deborah Brautigam, some studies use data from 
media reports that may not correspond to effective investment.8 Figures may be 
reliable when a specific survey has been carried out in a given country, region 
or sector. 
China’s FDI in SSA does not represent an important part of total Chinese 
outward investment: according to China’s Ministry of Commerce data, in 2014 
China’s FDI flows to ‘Africa’ represented only 2.6% of China’s total FDI flows 
(to be compared to 69% to Asia) (CAITEC, 2015) (data for SSA are not provid-
ed). For SSA, however, China’s FDI represents a rising share of its total inward 
5 Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) data therefore ‘doesn’t tell us that much’, as shown by Deborah 
Brautigam: see her post ‘Updated!’ China and US FDI Data: http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/p/
chinese-fdi.html
6 According to the IMF Balance of Payment Manual and OECD definition of FDI, ‘FDI refers to an 
investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the 
investor. (…) the investor´s purpose is to gain an effective voice in the management of the enterprise’. 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Foreign-Direct-Investment-(FDI).aspx
7 UNCTAD data on Chinese FDI are in fact based on those provided by MOFCOM. See data on China 
on http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx
8 See Deborah Brautigam’s posts on this issue, e.g. ‘Rubbery Numbers for Chinese Aid to Africa’, 30 
April 2013: http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2013/04/rubbery-numbers-on-chinese-aid.html
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FDI (IMF, 2011b). Chinese investment in SSA countries exhibit wide variations 
and differences: it may represent an important share of inward FDI in some SSA 
countries, while in a large and diversified economy such as South Africa, China 
is not even the first emerging country investor (Gelb, 2014). Table 1 shows these 
variations for a selection of SSA countries.
taBLe 1: Fdi FLoWs in the host economY BY geograPhicaL origin, china and Four 
main deveLoPed investing countries, 2001-2012, miLLions us doLLars
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Angola China - - - - - 22 41 - 10 8 101 73 392
France 38 -192 -79 22 678 694 694 519 -478 1 511 979 953
Portugal 46 -17 30 86 192 246 -1 051 -965 -512 208 524 530
United 
States 342 -263 - 36 - 22 98 280 - 99 789 77 1 968 707 -
Italy - - - - - - - 149 -110 100 -70 92
South  
Africa China - -  9 18 47 41 454 4 808 42 411 -14 - 815
Luxembourg - 108 -6 24 -32 212 771  768 1 473  220 -1 668 844
United 
Kingdom 468 3 395 3 628 7 031 7 942 2 697 3 470 2 421 1 548 3 800 2 906 8 036
United 
States -86 125 232 480 82 159 1 000 306 410 779 722 250
Germany -1 161 -129 -252 577 476 666 782 -34 307 740 605 316
Nigeria China - - - - - - - - - - 1 132 4 631
Lebanon - - - - - - - - - - 2 12 460
United 
States 8 13  14 14 33 32 40 54 57 40 119 4 532
United 
Kingdom 202 322  343 336 787 774 962 1 303 1 367 964 10 3 464
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - - 560 16 792
Kenya China - - 1 3 2 - 9 23 28 101 68 79
United 
Kingdom 60 48 95 86 133 114 194 123 179 301 101 -9
France 30 11 2 6 5 6 606 -192 13 -1 17 45
Belgium - - 1 - - - - - 215 123 21 -331
Switzerland 3 - -1 9 10 16 15 4 - 8 -168 39 16
23
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Ethiopia China - - 1 - 5 24 13 10 74 59 72 122
Italy - - - - - - - 41 32 10 8 -39
United 
States 1 2 1 1 -2 1 - - - 4 2 -
Turkey - - - - - - 4 6 - - - 1
Germany 8 -4 9 -1 - 2 1 5 4 3 - - -
Zambia China .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 .. 76  32 333 142
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. 147 .. 203  443  466 724
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 295 .. -116  389  119 -555
South Africa .. .. .. .. .. .. 106 .. 73 -51 -94 426
United 
Kingdom .. .. .. .. .. .. 106 .. -98  251 112 227
Sudan China - - - 147  91  51 65 -63 19  31  912 - 2
Germany - 5 - 11  15  1  2  1  1  3 - - - -
Italy - - - - - - -  23 - 1 2 3
Turkey - - - - -  2  4  4 2 - - -
Luxembourg - - - 4 - 1 - -  7 - - - -
Gabon China - - -  6  2  6  3 32 12 23 2 31
France 105 46 -33 99 138 158 275 382 54 - 8 26 207
Italy - - - - - - - 1 41 -10 6 11
Morocco - - - - - - - - 23 151 2 -
United 
States 2 -182 11 61 -166 -17 130 -439 .. .. .. -
Namibia China - - 1 - - 1 1 8 12 6 5 25
Germany 3 1 2 - 1 3 4 9 164 - - -
Luxembourg - - - - - -1 - - - - - 621
Spain - - - - - - - -  168 - 71 -127
Poland - - - - - - - - - - - 8
Source: UNCTAD database on bilateral FDI, based on information reported by economies. 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx
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According to the criteria developed by the canonical theory of Dunning 
(2000), the motives of FDI may be market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, re-
source-seeking, and strategic-assets-seeking motives (Box 1). 
Box 1: The four main motives of FDI according to John Dunning’s frame-
work
Dunning (2000: 164-165) distinguishes four main types of activity of 
foreign multinational enterprises:
1. That designed to satisfy a particular (or a set of) foreign market(s), i.e. 
market seeking, or demand oriented, FDI.
2. That designed to gain access to natural resources, e.g. minerals, ag-
ricultural products, unskilled labour, i.e. resource seeking, or supply 
oriented FDI.
3. That designed to promote a more efficient division of labour or spe-
cialisation of an existing portfolio of foreign and domestic assets by 
multinational enterprises, i.e. efficiency seeking FDI.
4. That designed to protect or augment the existing ownership specific 
advantages of the investing firms and/or to reduce those of their com-
petitors, i.e. strategic asset seeking FDI.
Milelli and Sindzingre (2013) analysed the behaviour of Chinese multina-
tionals in SSA using Dunning’s framework: they showed that it converges with 
the behaviour of Western multinationals, and, in particular, they demonstrate 
the convergence of the determinants of Chinese FDI in developed countries (in 
particular Europe) and SSA. While the determinants of Chinese FDI in devel-
oped countries were initially access to their markets, these now include effi-
ciency-seeking motives and assets-seeking motives (assets-seeking motives re-
maining a contrast with developing countries). FDI is driven by host countries’ 
endowments; SSA is endowed with natural resources, therefore FDI in SSA 
from developed countries as well as China is mostly driven by resource-seek-
ing motives - natural resources being strategic inputs for China’s growth. Re-
source-seeking motives characterise both Chinese and non-Chinese FDI in 
developed countries when these countries are resource-rich, e.g. Australia and 
Canada. Moreover, as shown by the many Chinese small and medium private 
enterprises that invest in SSA, market access has increasingly become a de-
terminant of Chinese FDI (Zhang et al., 2013), together with efficiency- and 
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assets-seeking motives. Rising labour costs in China serve as incentives for re-
locating abroad, particularly in labour-intensive sectors where competitiveness 
is driven by prices (Table 2). 
taBLe 2a: motives oF chinese Fdi: euroPe versus suB-saharan aFrica
Motive Europe Sub-Saharan Africa
Resource-seeking Main motive due to abundant 
natural resources
Market-seeking Still first motive New motive but rapidly 
expanding in order to supply 
local markets
Asset-seeking Motive rapidly expand-
ing, particularly since 




New motive, in order 
to acquire skilled work-
force and regionally 
streamline organisational 
structures
Relocation of Chinese firms, 
particularly SMEs, in low 
technology and labour- 
intensive industries
Source: Milelli and Sindzingre (2013), using Dunning’ (2000) conceptual framework.
taBLe 2B: Processes underLYing chinese Fdi: euroPe versus suB-saharan aFrica
Process Europe Sub-Saharan Africa
Linkage Linkages across Chinese  
communities and financial   
institutions, and African  
private sectors
Leverage Large financial resources 
(state-owned enterprises, state 
banks, sovereign wealth funds)
Large financial inflows
Learning Learning from previous  
partnerships in China with 
Western companies
Learning from Chinese failures 
or difficulties encountered in 
Europe
Source: Milelli and Sindzingre (2013), using Mathews’ (2006) conceptual framework.
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For example, a combination of market-, assets- and efficiency-seeking motives 
was illustrated by the purchase of Standard Bank, the largest bank of South 
Africa (Gelb, 2014: 16).9 The behaviour of Chinese private enterprises does not 
substantially differ from that analysed by canonical theories of FDI (Lin and 
Farrell, 2013).
Indeed, a great share of all FDI in SSA is directed towards primary resources, 
in particular oil. Developed countries’ investors invest in SSA resource sector; 
for example, in Angola, the United States is the leading investor in the oil sector 
(GAO, 2013). As with FDI in SSA from the rest of the world, Chinese FDI in 
SSA is also driven by resource-seeking motives, these resources being strategic 
for China’s own growth (oil, metals, Kragelund, 2009). As with other countries’ 
investments, Chinese FDI in SSA is therefore driven by the endowments of host 
countries in natural resources (Biggeri and Sanfilippo, 2009; Kolstad and Wiig, 
2011; Cheung et al., 2012, 2013; Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013 - these three 
studies underscoring that Chinese FDI in SSA is also induced by market-seek-
ing motives, thus confirming the convergence of the Chinese FDI patterns with 
those of industrialised countries).10 Equally, Chinese FDI in commodity sectors 
is mostly driven by large government-backed multinationals, which represent the 
largest share of FDI in value (an estimation being 77% of China’s FDI in SSA, 
Xu, 2014), while Chinese small and medium enterprises dominate in numbers. 
Publicly-funded enterprises play a major role in Chinese FDI in SSA (Pairault, 
2013a, b), and this may be also the case for Western multinationals investing in 
SSA (e.g., in utilities), large investments abroad often being a dimension of for-
eign policy. Alves (2013a) lists some major investments of China in SSA: e.g., 
Sinopec in Nigeria and Gabon (oil); Minmetals in DR Congo (copper); CNOOC 
in Uganda (oil); CNMC in Zambia (copper); or Sichuan Hanlong in Cameroon 
and Congo (iron ore). This Chinese ‘state capitalism’ may be compared with the 
support that Western governments provide to their national companies (Taylor, 
2014b), and is another element of convergence of China’s economic behaviour 
with SSA’s ‘traditional’ partners.
In addition, China’s FDI appears to be increasingly driven by the ‘linkages’, 
‘leverage’ and ‘learning’ motives (Mathews, 2006): firms invest in order to aug-
ment their competences by learning from their overseas investments (Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2009). Finally, as Western multinational firms, Chinese firms have 
harnessed trade agreements, such as unilateral trade preferences. Some US in-
9  The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) concluded the largest FDI deal in South African 
history in 2007, when ICBC paid $5.5 billion for a 20% stake in Standard Bank, Africa’s largest bank 
(China Daily, 25 March 2013).
10  The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for having suggested these studies.
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vestors have come to SSA thanks to the AGOA (African Growth and Opportu-
nity Act, a unilateral system of trade preferences granted by the US to a group 
of SSA countries that meet specific conditions), and China’s firms have also 
invested in SSA in order to use the AGOA for exporting to US markets.
(b) The positive spillover effects of ‘resource-for-infrastructure’ contracts
The so-called ‘commodity-for-infrastructure’ contracts (sometimes referred to 
as the ‘Angola model’), which are used by large Chinese firms, could constitute 
a difference with the pattern of FDI of Western countries. Chinese firms imple-
ment contractual packages in which investment in infrastructure (or loans) is 
exchanged for privileged access to and investment in commodities (Alden and 
Alves, 2009). 
These deals imply a risk of lock-in for SSA economies in the production and 
exporting of commodities, being sometimes conditioned to a stream of export 
of commodities over several years (Foster et al., 2009). In the list computed 
by Alves (2013b), four of the major ‘resource-for-infrastructure’ concessional 
loans in SSA over 2006-12 are indeed in the oil sector (Nigeria, Ghana and 
Angola), with two others in the mining sectors. Also, they are often opaque 
regarding the terms and the uses of the loans, and in some cases they may be 
viewed more as ‘debt’ than ‘investment’ (Hausmann, 2015). They may be linked 
to China’s interests, which are focused on the securing of the provision of raw 
materials for its own growth (Pairault, 2013b). 
Many of these contracts, however, are used for infrastructure projects. SSA 
is characterised by very low levels of infrastructure - power, electrification and 
transport -, which generate huge transaction costs on the circulation of goods 
and people, and impede competitiveness, trade and therefore diversification and 
growth. The possible negative impact of Chinese ‘resource-for-infrastructure’ 
contracts compared to FDI from Western countries may be counterbalanced by 
the positive impacts of the improvement in infrastructure on SSA growth, as 
infrastructure is a key determinant of growth (Calderon and Serven, 2010). The 
China-Africa White Paper (The People’s Republic of China, 2013) thus under-
scores Chinese enterprises and financial institutions’ participation in SSA infra-
structure, including transportation, communications and electric power projects, 
notably via commercial and concessional loans (e.g., the Addis Ababa-Adama 
Expressway of Ethiopia and the Kribi Deep-water Port of Cameroon). Some of 
China’s main commercial banks have also started offering buyer’s credit busi-
nesses in SSA, supporting e.g., the power grid in Ghana or hydropower stations 
in Ethiopia.
African Review of Economics and Finance
28
In fine, SSA countries and governments cannot be viewed as passive entities 
both vis-à-vis developed countries and China. Whatever the constraints ana-
lysed above, they have a capacity for ‘agency’ vis-à-vis the Chinese government 
and firms (Mohan and Lampert, 2013). As been demonstrated in Angola, the 
provision of infrastructure financed by oil-backed concessional loans may mask 
a relationship of ‘uneasy allies’ (Corkin, 2011b; 2013). As argued by Alves 
(2013c), in fine the responsibility to ensure positive outcomes for these ‘infra-
structure-for-resources’ loans rests on the side of SSA as much as on China.
3. A specific contribution of China to sub-Saharan African economies?
3.1. A channel of relationships that contrasts China with Western countries: aid
(a) The contrast between Chinese and Western aid
Some SSA countries are excessively dependent on aid, e.g., for budgets, invest-
ment, maintenance, infrastructure, health, education. Net official development 
assistance (ODA) to SSA in 2013 represented 3% of GNI, 14.6% of gross cap-
ital formation and 8.2% of imports of goods, services and income (World Bank 
Development Indicators, 2015, table 6.11). Despite important variations within 
SSA, besides the small island economies of Oceania, SSA is the region of the 
world that is the most dependent on aid. This poor performance is being driven 
by SSA’s low-income countries. Aid dependence induces well-known negative 
effects, including Dutch disease, those stemming from aid volatility (Bulir and 
Hamann, 2008), and the undermining of institutions, in particular tax institu-
tions (Moss et al., 2006).
China’s aid refers to an old tradition of cooperation, which began in the 1960s 
and includes most notably the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway 
(Brautigam, 2009; 2010). Chinese aid flows are notoriously difficult to compute, 
as Chinese statistics do not use the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) criteria that define ODA.11 It is therefore difficult to disentangle Chinese 
aid (in the sense of ODA) from other flows, notably commercial flows. The 
OECD, however, computes ‘ODA-like’ flows, i.e. concessional financing for 
development, for ‘non-traditional’ donors such as China, and Chinese flows are 
still limited as compared to ‘traditional’ major donors (OECD, 2014).12 China’s 
‘ODA-like’ flows remain well below those of major DAC bilateral donors: 3 
billion US dollars in 2013 (2.6 billion in 2010),13 as compared to United States’ 
11 See also Brautigam’s very relevant blog: http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com
12 The OECD does not provide data on the recipient countries of these ‘ODA-like’ flows. 
13 Source: OECD-DAC, aid statistics, statistics on resource flows to developing countries, table 33a. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm (September 2015).
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net ODA of 30.8 billion US dollars (current), or United Kingdom’s net ODA of 
17.9 billion US dollars.14 According to the Government of China’s White Pa-
per on aid (People’s Republic of China State Council, 2014), China’s financial 
resources provided for aid fall into three types: grants (aid gratis), interest-free 
loans and concessional loans (although levels of concessionality between China 
and other donors are difficult to compare, Christensen, 2010), and between 2010 
and 2012, China provided 14.4 billion US dollars in grants, interest-free loans 
and concessional loans. The contrast with the OECD-DAC figures underscores 
the difficulty in assessing China’s aid flows. The first two types come from 
China’s state finances, while concessional loans are provided by the EximBank. 
This distribution through several channels demonstrates the close links between 
trade, investment and aid. For Brautigam (2009), China’s aid to Africa is much 
less important than EximBank export credits, but it nevertheless exhibits a clear 
increase (Brautigam, 2009; Mlachila and Takebe, 2011). The White Paper on 
aid (2014) mentions that from 2010 to 2012, Africa (not SSA) received 51.8% 
of these ‘Foreign Assistance Funds’.15 
Chinese aid flows display variations across countries. Despite the difficulty of 
comparisons due to the heterogeneity of flows and lack of data, in some coun-
tries China’s aid may be substantial. In Ghana for example, during the period 
2006-2010, US grant commitments exceeded China’s, but the US government 
committed smaller amounts of loans than China, China’s loans being primarily 
for infrastructure and the repayment of some loans being tied to commodities 
(oil, cocoa) (GAO, 2013). In Kenya, China has become one of the top donors 
since 2009, primarily providing concessional loans (GAO, 2013).
China’s cooperation exhibits many characteristics that contrast with West-
ern developed countries’ aid. Chinese aid includes direct finance to Chinese 
firms and resource-backed infrastructure loans (Davies, 2008), i.e. the financing 
of infrastructure through the ‘infrastructure for commodities’ abovementioned 
‘packages’ associating aid, trade and investment. Such financing is less conces-
sional than aid from Western donors and resembles exports credits. China’s aid 
also differs from ‘traditional’ donors by its links with the state banks and enter-
prises, often involved in the implementation of China’s foreign policy vis-à-vis 
SSA (Christensen, 2010). Yet, some practices of OECD-DAC donors may be 
14 Source: OECD-DAC, aid statistics, table 1. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowsto 
developingcountries.htm (September 2015)
15 The White Paper does not provide data that are specific to SSA. This figure therefore only shows that 
‘Africa’ is the part of the world to which China allocates the greatest share of its aid. As significant 
amounts of China’s aid flows go to North Africa, China’s aid flows to SSA represent a lower percent-
age.
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comparable: their state-backed export-import banks may cover the risk taken by 
their private firms in recipient countries, and the bilateral aid of many OECD-
DAC donors was ‘tied’ until recently, i.e. the procurement of goods and services 
is limited to the donor country. However, aid tying differs from the concept of 
policy conditionality, and in 2013, OECD-DAC bilateral aid was mostly untied 
(83.2% on average).16 China’s model of cooperation has in fact followed the one 
practised by Japan in Asia, linking aid, investment and trade, despite important 
operational differences (Nissanke and Söderberg, 2011). Equally, Chinese aid 
has not suffered from volatility in amounts and paradigms that has characterised 
Western aid (e.g., since the 1960s, focusing on infrastructure, then poverty re-
duction, then public expenditure reform, etc.) (Brautigam, 2009). 
(b) Chinese aid: avoiding the detrimental effects of conditionalities?
A key point is that this mode of development cooperation - made of a nexus 
of aid, trade and investment - does not include economic conditionalities on 
particular public policies (i.e., the ‘exchange of finance for reform’). This is a 
major difference with Western aid. Whether it is made of loans or grants, the 
development assistance of OECD-DAC countries, of IFIs or of a major donor 
such as the European Commission is conditional on economic, and often, polit-
ical reforms (e.g. ‘good governance’).17 
In contrast, China’s aid is more a development cooperation driven by dip-
lomatic and political economy relationships, which go back to the period of 
independence of SSA countries in the late 1950s-early 1960s and Cold War 
context, and its motives are broader than strictly economic ones, as they ex-
plicitly include the support of Chinese firms (Brautigam, 2009). China’s claims 
non-interference with recipient countries domestic affairs and its cooperation 
therefore deals with all regimes, be they illiberal democracies or even ‘pariah’ 
regimes (Alden, 2007). Chinese aid is therefore often criticised for supporting 
dictatorships and corrupt political regimes (Samy, 2010; on Zimbabwe, Hodzi 
et al., 2012).
This lack of conditionality is in sharp contrast with the conditionalities at-
tached by major Western donors. Cooperation between SSA governments and 
the Chinese government – with its various agencies (e.g., the EximBank, the 
MOFCOM, the China-Africa Development Fund) – involves conditions, e.g. on 
the contracts established between the African and the Chinese contractor. Such 
conditions, however, radically differ, e.g., from IFI conditionalities that involve 
16 Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm, table 23. 
17 However, while China does not impose economy-wide or ‘good governance’ conditionalities, it does 
impose a political condition on the recipients of its aid, i.e. the non-recognition of Taiwan.
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for recipient countries extended policy reforms that encompass the entire econ-
omy (as World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes). These conditional-
ities may even be supplemented by political conditionalities, as in the case of 
the EU, which conditions its aid flows on ‘good governance’ or norms related to 
labour and environment (as the EU Generalised System of Preferences). Such 
extensive and deep conditionalities are also found in bilateral aid mechanisms 
such as the US AGOA, which conditions its trade preferences on market-based 
economies with effective rule of law,18 or the Millennium Challenge Corpora-
tion, which conditions its financial flows to recipient countries on their ‘demo-
cratic governance’ and ‘economic freedom’.19
The absence of wide and deep conditionalities, as is the case of China, may 
have positive effects on SSA economies. It has been argued that with this ‘non-in-
terference’ stance, China has been able to import more from SSA countries that 
exhibit a lower governance standing: thus filling a gap left open by the other 
major world economies, China contributes positively to SSA development (De 
Grauwe et al., 2012). Moreover, as has been shown by a large literature, Western 
agencies’ ‘exchange’ of finance for deep policy reform has had many detrimen-
tal effects on recipient economies. Conditionalities, be they fiscal, monetary, or 
political, can be very intrusive and prescribe drastic changes in recipient coun-
tries economic and political equilibria. 
The absence of conditionality on financing may induce many problems, e.g., 
the support of certain types of political regimes, opaque deals, corruption and 
the like. It may be argued, however, that conditional aid as practiced by devel-
oped countries also includes these problems: for developed countries and China, 
cooperation is driven by political and commercial interests – and China’s aid 
here converges with developed countries (Dreher and Fuchs, 2011). Aid has al-
ways been a dimension of the foreign policy of developed economies regardless 
of the needs of developing countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Deaton, 2013). 
Aid has also allowed for the maintenance in power of autocratic and corrupt re-
gimes, which use aid as a rent and for redistribution to clienteles. They also ma-
nipulate donors’ conditions as instruments for the implementation of their own 
domestic politics or use donors as ‘scapegoats’ (Vreeland, 1999). Developed 
countries have delivered aid to corrupt governments as much as to less corrupt 
(Alesina and Weder, 2002). The share of OECD-DAC countries’ aid going to 
corrupt countries has actually increased since the early 1990s, despite condi-
tionalities and the rhetoric of ‘good governance’ (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008), 
and aid to autocracies has not diminished (Easterly, 2013).
18  Source: http://trade.gov/agoa/eligibility/index.asp
19  Source: http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection
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Equally, key detrimental aspects are inherent to the mechanism of condition-
ality itself (i.e., making ex ante committed aid conditional on reform). They have 
long been demonstrated since the first IFI programmes. When SSA governments 
were obliged to call the IFIs for financial rescue from the 1980s onwards, due 
to the fall in commodity prices, the IFIs implemented policy-based lending. As 
SSA countries’ performance did not improve in the 1980s and 1990s (the ‘lost 
decades’), the IFIs reacted by augmenting their conditionalities in the 1990s, 
and adding ‘selectivity’ to conditionality, where donors lend to governments 
that already have good policies and institutions. As a result conditionalities are 
effective mostly in countries that wish to reform. Conditionalities became in-
creasingly structural and extended to non-economic issues, e.g., ‘governance’. 
Conditionality inherently implies a limitation of sovereignty, triggers resistance 
(stemming from the ‘buying of reform’), and paves the way for the ‘aid game’. 
A reaction of the IFIs in the 2000s was to promote the ‘ownership’ of reforms 
by recipient countries: yet reforms that are prescribed in exchange for finance 
cannot be ‘owned’. The persistent failure of conditional IMF stabilisation pro-
grammes has led, on the donors side, to a repetition of lending since the 1980s 
onwards, and on the recipients side, to the continuation of dependence on donor 
lending, which has been acknowledged by the IMF (the ‘prolonged users’, IMF-
IEO, 2002). 
Attempts by the IFIs to reform conditionality have met with mixed success, 
e.g. budget support. The devising of ex post and ex ante conditionalities or in-
centives do not change the intrinsic asymmetry of conditionality, i.e. the rela-
tionships between the one who has the power to give money and therefore im-
pose conditions, and the one who needs it. Conditionality indeed demonstrates 
the inherent divergence of interests and asymmetry between the aid-providing 
donor and an aid-receiving government (including domestic interest groups). 
These divergences entail negative effects. Donors may impose conditions on 
unwilling recipients, while recipients may be willing but unable to implement 
conditions. Aid is typically affected by the ‘Samaritan dilemma’ (Gibson et al., 
2005). For example, if the recipient government knows that donors condition 
their aid on a reduction of poverty, it has little incentive to exert high effort 
toward this objective, as in doing so it will receive less aid in the future; and 
the ‘Samaritan’s dilemma’ is aggravated by moral hazard: the donor can never 
know if a poor outcome is the result of low effort (‘bad policies’) or ‘bad luck’ 
(Svensson, 2005). Conditional aid indeed inherently exhibits important coordi-
nation failures. On their side, donors cannot enforce the conditions due to their 
own institutional incentives to lend. The device of conditionality has therefore 
contributed to the erosion of the credibility of the IFIs vis-à-vis borrowing coun-
tries (Marchesi and Sabani, 2007). 
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In being non-conditional, China’s aid avoids these pitfalls, and may therefore 
be more effective. China’s organisation of cooperation, not in the position of 
prescribing economy-wide policy reforms, thus displays a significant contrast 
with developed countries’ development assistance. This difference, however, 
may diminish over time and a certain convergence with ‘traditional’ developed 
countries’ donors may emerge. As Grimm has shown (2014), the discourse at-
tached by the Chinese government to its cooperation with SSA, which under-
scores ‘mutual benefits’ and ‘non interference’, may indeed be challenged by 
the mixed success of this cooperation over time in terms of development of 
SSA. The Chinese government may also be confronted with the necessity for 
SSA countries to implement policy reform. 
3.2. China’s contribution of industrialisation in sub-Saharan Africa: a driver of 
structural transformation?
(a)  China’s investment in sub-Saharan Africa’s manufacturing sectors
China also invests in industrial sectors of SSA. Besides oil and mining, Chinese 
firms invest in the manufacturing, construction, finance, agriculture and servic-
es sectors (IMF, 2011b). Large state-backed firms tend to focus on resources 
and infrastructure, whereas private firms concentrate more on manufacturing 
and service industries. Although investment in the commodity sectors and in-
frastructure may be the largest in value, the number of private projects in other 
sectors is growing and driven by private small and medium enterprises (and 
even large firms20), which target local and regional markets. In addition, large 
Chinese state-owned enterprises that invest in SSA are associated with a great 
number of smaller firms (especially in the construction sector, e.g., sub-contrac-
tors) (Xu, 2014). This may create positive spillover effects and Hirschmanian 
backward and forward linkages within SSA economies (Hirschman, 1958).
According to China’s White Paper (The People’s Republic of China, 2013), 
Chinese FDI has also been oriented towards resource-poor countries: Chinese 
enterprises have invested in sugar refineries in Mali, set up glass, fur, medi-
cal capsule and automobile factories in Ethiopia, and invested in textile and 
steel pipe manufacturing projects in Uganda. Moreover, in some SSA countries 
Chinese FDI is more concentrated in the manufacturing sector than in primary 
commodities. An example is Ethiopia (IMF, 2011b), and its shoe sector, where 
one of the largest shoe exporters in China has started an important investment 
in 2013; within one year this factory had more than doubled Ethiopia’s footwear 
exports (Lin and Wang, 2014a). Chinese manufacturers increasingly invest in 
20 As mentioned above, a major non-resource-related Chinese investment in SSA is the purchase of a 20% 
stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.
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SSA in order to benefit from preferential trade tariffs and lower labour costs 
(Dinh et al., 2012). China established several Special Economic Zones in SSA 
with the aim of promoting manufacturing (Brautigam and Tang, 2011; 2014). 
An increasing number of private medium and small enterprises from China op-
erate in SSA in the sectors of manufacturing, infrastructure, agriculture, and 
services (Shen, 2015; Gu, 2009). 
(b) The contribution of China to sub-Saharan Africa’s structural transformation
China’s growth is expected to stay high in the medium term (Felipe et al., 2013), 
despite a deceleration in 2015 and the uncertainties associated with the reori-
entation of its growth towards domestic consumption. China’s contribution to 
growth rates in SSA, via its demand for SSA exports, and via its contribution to 
international commodity prices, is therefore likely to continue. This contribu-
tion to SSA growth gives these countries additional fiscal room for manoeuvre, 
in particular for their policy choices, i.e. public policies focusing on structural 
transformation, such as industrial policies. This route was chosen by the Asian 
‘developmental states’ at the time of their ‘catch-up’ in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). 
The diffusion of the benefits of growth, however, is not automatic. It may 
even be more difficult for commodity-dependent countries (Macmillan et al., 
2014), notably due to the ‘lock in’ effects and trapping mechanisms that are 
generated by the incentives provided by commodities prices (Sindzingre, 2012). 
It depends on the domestic characteristics of SSA countries, notably on whether 
these countries have the appropriate economic institutions that are able to chan-
nel the benefits stemming from growth. Indeed, SSA countries may be plagued 
by ‘extractive’ institutions that prevent the diffusion of knowledge throughout 
the society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). SSA countries may also lack the 
capabilities and knowhow that are necessary to transform the benefits of growth 
into foundations for long-term growth via the diffusion of technology and high-
er total factor productivity (Arthur, 2009; Hausmann, 2014).
Yet it may be argued that even the specialisation in the export of commodities 
may contribute to the industrialisation of SSA countries via spillover effects 
and linkages with other sectors that exhibit higher productivity and diffusion 
of knowledge and technology. Trade and investment in the sector of prima-
ry commodities are not necessarily obstacles to industrialisation. Investments 
in commodity sectors may induce positive effects in other sectors, including 
the manufacturing or the service sectors, via forward and backward linkages in 
Hirschman’s sense (Morris et al., 2012). SSA countries, however, differ among 
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themselves: for example, as shown by Corkin (2011a), China’s investment in 
Angola’s oil sector generated few spillovers. Such impacts and possible linkage 
effects are subject to wide variations across SSA.21
In addition, emerging countries entering into trade and investment relation-
ships means more players and more capital inflows towards SSA, which is pos-
itive. Also, China’s growth implies increasing wages and costs, hence windows 
of opportunities for certain SSA countries that can serve as substitutes, where 
Chinese FDI can outsource activities of the low-end segments of production net-
works. China’s industrial upgrading and FDI may thus foster light manufactur-
ing in SSA, with the associated job creation (Lin and Wang, 2014b). Likewise, 
if China’s growth rates continue, its demand for SSA products will not only be 
directed towards primary commodities but also towards low-tech manufactured 
products that will no longer be made in China due to increasing local factor 
costs. China also contributes to SSA structural transformation in improving its 
infrastructure. 
The sector of manufactured products with little sophistication– which is usu-
ally labour-intensive – is often viewed as a first step towards industrialisation 
and diversification. China’s investment in SSA industrial sectors is an oppor-
tunity for structural change for SSA economies, since industrialisation is a key 
determinant of long-term growth.
4. Conclusion
This paper has underscored two points. Firstly, it has shown the complexity 
and ambivalent effects of China on SSA, because these effects depend on the 
channels – trade, investment, aid – and the time horizons that are considered. 
While China’s cooperation may have the advantage of being less affected by the 
detrimental effects of Western conditional aid, China’s strong demand for pri-
mary commodities may perpetuate the negative effects of the current commodi-
ty-based export structure of most SSA countries. Equally, while the contribution 
of China to the structural transformation of SSA faces important constraints in 
the short–term, China may have the potential of fostering this transformation 
via multiple channels: higher commodity prices and the fiscal space they repre-
sent for SSA budgets, demand for SSA products, investment and infrastructure.
21  The argument that commodities can generate upstream and downstream linkages that may be positive 
for the manufacturing and services sectors has been analysed in the ‘Making the Most of Commodities 
Programme’ (Morris et al., 2012): yet several of its case studies (e.g., Corkin, 2011a) find limited link-
ages. See http://www.commodities.open.ac.uk/discussionpapers
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Secondly, the paper has shown that the economic relationships of China with 
SSA increasingly converge with those of Western countries, and that its trade 
and investment patterns are in most aspects similar to those of industrialised 
countries with SSA – e.g., trading primary commodities and volume of invest-
ments that are more important in the commodity sectors (oil, metals). An im-
portant difference, i.e. a development cooperation that for China is not based on 
economy-wide policy conditionality, may also converge with time with that of 
other donors.
Regarding China as well as industrialised countries, SSA governments and 
societies have a capacity for agency. Outcomes also always result from com-
binations of elements. External forces are always transformed by internal fea-
tures and there is room for manoeuvre for domestic policies. Domestic political 
economy creates the difference between countries that will be able to harness 
the Chinese investors’ demand for lower cost when China’s production costs 
will become too high, e.g. in the textile sector, and countries that will remain in 
the production of primary commodities with the associated vulnerabilities. In 
some countries path dependence may prevail, while, as shown by Arthur (1994), 
small bifurcations may occur in others and produce unexpected effects. 
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